Clark, Richard and Anna M. Meyerrose. 2025. “Austerity and Aggression: Government Responses to IMF Conditionality.” World Politics 7(1): 111-154.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) offers countries emergency financial support in exchange for the implementation of stringent policy conditions that often cause political and economic upheaval in target states. How do leaders in borrower countries respond to the backlash from publics and elites that often emerges in these cases? We argue that leaders seek to divert attention from economic issues under IMF conditionality by employing security-oriented rhetoric and sparking low-cost skirmishes internationally. Such diversionary tactics may help leaders to skirt blame for the short-term economic costs of IMF-imposed structural adjustment by driving a rally-around-the-flag effect. We pair text analysis of ruling party manifestos with regression analysis of the relationship between IMF conditionality and the initiation of interstate disputes, finding support for our argument.
Meyerrose, Anna M. and Irfan Nooruddin. 2025. “Trojan Horses in Liberal International Organizations? How Democratic Backsliders Undermine the UNHRC.” Review of International Organizations, 20, 125-156.
Liberal democracy is facing renewed challenges from a growing group of states undergoing democratic backsliding. While entrenched autocrats have long resented and contested the established liberal order, we know far less about how newer backsliding states behave on the international stage. We argue these states, who joined prominent western liberal institutions prior to their backsliding, will use their established membership in these organizations both to protect themselves from future scrutiny regarding adherence to liberal democratic values, and to oppose the prevailing western liberal norms that increasingly conflict with their evolving interests. Using voting data from the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) from 2006–2021, we show that backsliding states are more likely to vote against targeted resolutions that name and shame specific countries. We supplement this analysis with detailed data from the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) and combine regression analysis and a structural topic model (STM) to show that backsliding states are more critical in their UPR reports when evaluating advanced western democracies, and more likely to emphasize issues that align with their own interests while de-emphasizing ones that might threaten government power and control over citizens.
Meyerrose, Anna M. and Sara Watson. 2024. “The Effects of Import Shocks, Electoral Institutions, and Radical Party Competition on Legislator Ideology: Evidence from France.” British Journal of Political Science 54(3): 547-572. (Lead article).
Across advanced industrialized democracies, the political center is collapsing as politicians on both the far-right and far-left enjoy increasing electoral success. Recent research links import shocks to voter support for far-right parties; however, we know comparatively less about how these shocks impact individual legislator ideology, and especially the ideology of mainstream politicians. Do import shocks drive economic or cultural ideological shifts among mainstream legislators? And if so, to what extent do local competitive contexts shape these shifts? Using an original dataset of French Senate roll call votes, we find localized increases in import exposure move elite ideology to the left economically; these effects are magnified in departments with competitive majoritarian electoral systems. We also show legislators shift their cultural positions in response to these shocks, but only when faced with extremist political competitors focused on cultural issues. Our results suggest the value of attending to how political and economic geography intersect to shape elite policy positions.
Watson, Sara and Anna M. Meyerrose. 2024. “Legislative Behavior in the French Senate: A Dataset from the Fifth Republic.” Party Politics.
This research note presents a new dataset on the French Senate. We provide demographic (1968–2017) and electoral (1983–2020) data for all Senate districts, biographical and political characteristics for all senators who served during the Fifth Republic (1959–2017), and data on roll-call votes (RCVs), individual senator votes in relation to them, and the corresponding bill content (1996–2017). In this note, we describe the structure of our datasets, provide descriptive information on key variables, highlight temporal shifts in ideological trends in the French Senate, and discuss possible future research topics. We anticipate these data will make an important addition to the rapidly growing literature on upper chambers and legislative dynamics.
Meyerrose, Anna M. 2024. “Building Strong Executives and Weak Institutions: How European Integration Contributes to Democratic Backsliding.” Review of International Organizations 19, 307-343.
Although the European Union (EU) is considered unrivaled in its democracy promoting abilities, democracy is being challenged within its borders. Over the last decade, Hungary’s ruling party has debilitated or eliminated liberal democratic institutions; similar trends have emerged in Poland and other new democracies in the EU. What explains these surprising cases of democratic backsliding? Researchers have identified the limits of conditionality and the EU’s inability to counteract backsliding. However, given the EU’s extensive role in democracy building in its member states, it is critical to also consider the EU as an initial source of backsliding. This paper argues that the EU’s post-Maastricht policy structure, accession process, and membership requirements have made democratic backsliding more likely in new democracies by simultaneously increasing executive power and limiting states’ domestic policy space, which stunts institutional development. This combination of factors creates opportunities for executives to manipulate already weak institutions to increase their power, and democratic backsliding becomes more likely. A comparative analysis that combines typical and control cases provides support for this argument. These findings extend beyond the EU to contribute to emerging research on the limits of international democracy promotion and the related long-term effects that IOs have on domestic democratic institutional development.
Meyerrose, Anna M. 2022.“International Sources of Democratic Backsliding.” In Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism, Routledge.
International support for democracy promotion grew substantially after the Cold War, with research overwhelmingly finding international actors are positive forces for democracy. However, this increased emphasis on democracy has been followed by rampant illiberalism and a sharp rise in cases of democratic backsliding in new democracies. What explains democratic backsliding in an age of unparalleled international support for democracy? In what ways has the international environment contributed to recent backsliding and illiberalism around the world? Democratic backsliding occurs when elected officials weaken or erode democratic institutions and results in an illiberal or diminished form of democracy. This chapter argues aspects of economic globalization have unintentionally contributed to backsliding. To develop this argument, the chapter focuses on one aspect of globalization in particular, international organizations (IOs), arguing that these institutions have unintentionally contributed to backsliding via three interrelated mechanisms: neglecting to support institutions outside elections and executives; increasing relative executive power; and limiting domestic policy options. However, these domestic-level impacts are not unique to IOs. After outlining the mechanisms linking IOs to backsliding in new democracies, this chapter discusses how these outcomes are relevant to other aspects of globalization, the implications for both new and mature democracies, and areas for future research.
Meyerrose, Anna M. 2020. “The Unintended Consequences of Democracy Promotion: International Organizations and Democratic Backsliding.” 2020. Comparative Political Studies 53(10-11): 1547-1581. (Lead Article).
Since the end of the Cold War, international organizations (IOs) have engaged in unprecedented levels of democracy promotion, and research overwhelmingly links them to positive democratic outcomes. However, this increased emphasis on democracy has more recently been accompanied by rampant illiberalism and a sharp rise in cases of democratic backsliding in new democracies. What explains democratic backsliding in an age of unparalleled international support for democracy? Backsliding occurs when democratic institutions are weakened or eroded by elected officials, resulting in an illiberal or diminished form of democracy. I argue that IOs that support democracy unintentionally make backsliding more likely by neglecting to promote democratic institutions other than executives and elections, increasing executive power, and limiting states’ domestic policy options, which stunts institutional development. I find membership in IOs associated with democracy promotion makes backsliding more likely, decreases checks on executive power, and limits domestic policy options and party development in new democracies.
Meyerrose, Anna M., Thomas Edward Flores, and Irfan Nooruddin. 2019. “From Elections to Democracy in Hard Times.” In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, Oxford University Press.
The end of the Cold War, heralded as the ideological triumph of (Western) liberal democracy, was accompanied by an electoral boom and historically high levels of economic development. More recently, however, democratic progress has stalled, populism has been on the rise, and a number of democracies around the world are either backsliding or failing entirely. What explains this contemporary crisis of democracy despite conditions theorized to promote democratic success? Research on democratization and democracy promotion tends to focus predominantly on elections. Although necessary for democracy, free and fair elections are more effective at promoting democratic progress when they are held in states with strong institutions, such as those that can guarantee the rule of law and constraints on executive power. However, increased globalization and international economic integration have stunted the development of these institutions by limiting states’ economic policy options, and, as a result, their fiscal policy space. When a state’s fiscal policy space—or, its ability to collect and spend revenue—is limited, governments are less able to provide public goods to citizens, politicians rely on populist rather than ideological appeals to win votes, and elections lose their democratizing potential. Additional research from a political–economic framework that incorporates insights from studies on state building and institutions with recent approaches to democratization and democracy promotion, which focus predominantly on elections, is needed. Such a framework provides avenues for additional research on the institutional aspects of ongoing democratization and democratic backsliding.
Meyerrose, Anna M. 2018. “It is all about value: How domestic party brands influence voting patterns in the European Parliament.” Governance 31(4): 625-642.
Research on the European Parliament finds legislative voting patterns remained constant following the Eastern enlargement of the European Union. This article shows that Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from these new member states are actually more likely to vote along European party lines. Given that these MEPs often come from less institutionalized domestic party systems that lack norms of legislative discipline, we should expect them to exhibit more erratic voting behavior than MEPs from mature systems. Why would stronger party discipline at the European level be associated with more volatile and fragmented domestic party systems? This article argues MEPs from less institutionalized systems rely more on the brand of their European party, which provides better information and career opportunities than their parties at home, and thus are more likely to vote along European party lines. I find support for this theory using data from the sixth European Parliament (2004–2009).
Anna M. Meyerrose 